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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Defendant/Appellee Amy E. Kabatznick ("Kabatznick") submits Appellee's 
Brief in response to the Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Architectural Committee of 
the Mt. Olympus Cove Subdivision No. 3 ("Architectural Committee" or 
"Committee"). 
L PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
A. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996), as a case transferred from the 
Supreme Court. 
B. EXCLUSION OF ISSUE NOT PRESENTED TO TRIAL COURT. 
In the Architectural Committee's Brief in "Issues Presented on Appeal and 
Standard of Review" under issues (b) and (c), it argues that Rule 17(a) URCP 
allows a reasonable time for amendment to add the real party in interest and 
based thereon the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action and 
striking Plaintiffs first and second amended complaints attempting to substitute 
three property owners as new parties plaintiff. The Committee also asserts under 
determinative statutes and rules that Rule 17(a) is controlling citing the text and 
in Argument in. B. However, the Committee at no time raised this issue or 
argument before the trial court nor cited Rule 17(a) in any pleading or 
memoranda submitted to the court, and it had the opportunity at least in its 
1 
motion and memorandum for leave to file a second amended complaint and failed 
to do so. Since this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, in keeping with 
long-standing tradition, this Court should decline to consider it. Ong Int'l 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). 
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This action was commenced by an entity identified in the complaint as 
"Architectural Committee of the Mt. Olympus Cove, Subdivision No. 3, Plaintiff" 
against Amy Kabatznick, a lot owner in the Subdivision, seeking an injunction to 
prevent her from completing her home under construction, and for a mandatory 
injunction to compel the removal of substantial completed portions of her home, 
as allegedly in violation of Restrictive Covenants recorded in 1966 applicable to 
forty-eight (48) lots in the Subdivision (complaint U's 1, 2, 3; R. 1, 2). The 
Committee claimed to be a duly constituted architectural committee under the 
Covenants, as the recent appointed successor to the president of the original 
developer, who was a one-man architectural committee named in the recorded 
Covenants (complaint U's 4, 5; R. 2). The Committee alleged that it brought the 
action on behalf of the "residents of the subdivision" it claimed would be 
irreparably harmed if Kabatznick's home was completed (complaint H 21; R. 6) 
because in its opinion her home design was not in conformity and harmony with 
other homes (complaint H 12; R. 4). 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
After initial pleadings were filed and discovery was conducted, in May 
1996, Kabatznick filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for the 
Committee's lack of standing. After full briefing and oral argument was heard, 
on June 26, 1996 the court announced its ruling in a telephone conference with 
counsel, finding that the Committee lacked standing to commence or maintain an 
action to enforce the Covenants either on its own behalf or in a representative 
capacity, but determining that the court had discretion to permit the Committee's 
individual members, who owned property in the Subdivision, to be substituted for 
the Committee and if each of such members immediately joined in the action as 
parties plaintiff in substitution for the Committee, the motion to dismiss would be 
denied and the action could proceed (R. 519-520). However, the Committee's 
amended complaint failed to comply with the court's order, and upon 
Kabatznick's motion to strike and renewed motion to dismiss, and after briefing 
and a hearing, the court struck the amended complaint and entered an order of 
dismissal for the Committee's lack of standing (R. 512-522). Fifteen (15) days 
after the court announced its bench ruling ordering dismissal, the Committee filed 
a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, but such motion was 
denied as moot (R. 524). 
C. DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court granted Kabatznick's motion to dismiss for the Committee's 
lack of standing for the reasons set forth in her supporting memoranda, including: 
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the Committee owned no property in the Subdivision and could suffer no injury 
from any violation of the Covenants; under the express terms of the Covenants 
the right of enforcement is specifically granted to owners of land and there is no 
provision authorizing enforcement by the Committee created under the same 
Covenants; the Committee was not elected or appointed by lot owners, nor was it 
required to be; was not conferred with any representative capacity on behalf of 
lot owners or residents, and had no authorization or capacity to sue on behalf of 
lot owners to enforce the Covenants; the Committee lacked authority or capacity 
as a legal entity to sue or to sue in a fictitious name; and, all the foregoing 
resulted in the court having no jurisdiction and the action being a nullity (Order, 
R. 519-522; Hearing Transcript, R. 554-555; R. 259-273). The dismissal was 
without prejudice to any right of individual property owners in the Subdivision to 
commence an action on their own behalf to enforce the Covenants. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Kabatznick's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for the 
Committee's lack of standing was initially presented as a motion confined to the 
pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP (R. 195-210). However, when plaintiff 
Committee responded by introducing facts outside the pleadings (R. 233-242), 
Kabatznick replied with further facts outside the pleadings1 which she deemed 
1
 This appears appropriate not just because Committee raised factual issues outside of 
the complaint, but also for the court to properly consider standing which is often raised prior 
to the introduction of evidence and under such circumstances may require the court to 
exercise its judgment about whether proof of the facts would be difficult or impossible. Soc. 
of Prof. Journalists, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987). 
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undisputed based on deposition transcripts cited (R. 259-276). Such factual 
matters were presented to the trial court with no objection or dispute by the 
parties and when matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded, 
under Rule 12(b) URCP the motion is properly treated as one for summary 
judgment under Rule 56. Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983). Since 
the statement of facts in Kabatznick's reply memorandum were not contradicted 
or challenged by opposing affidavit or otherwise, under Rule 56(e) URCP for 
purposes of summary judgment they are treated as uncontested facts. See Seftel 
v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, Kabatznick 
reproduces the undisputed statement of facts contained in her reply memorandum 
(R. 260-262): 
1. The architectural committee created in Article I. of the Covenants 
was composed of one individual named David K. Richards, who was not the 
original declarant or owner of the Subdivision property (see Covenants, Exhibit I. 
to Plaintiffs complaint; the declarant and property owner was "Mount Olympus 
Park, Inc., a Utah corporation"). [Copy of Covenants at Appendix I.]. 
2. For nearly 30 years, Mr. Richards never appointed anyone else to be 
on the "Committee" with him, and then only did so after Defendant began 
construction of her home. (Richards Depo., pp. 19, 63). 
3. Mr. Richards was not a property owner nor a resident of the 
Subdivision for almost 10 years prior to appointing a successor Committee. 
(Richard's Depo., p. 39). 
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4. In May 1994, Defendant obtained a building permit to demolish and 
rebuild her home over the existing foundation, and by November or December of 
1994, demolition was done and reconstruction of Defendant's new home had 
begun. (Burningham Depo., pp. 14, 15; Bardsley Depo., p. 29). 
5. Mr. Richards became aware of the demolition in 1994, and realized 
that he had not received or reviewed any plans for the construction but he was 
not concerned about it because he was building his own home (not in the 
Subdivision) and was no longer living in the neighborhood. (Richards Depo., pp. 
57 to 59). Even in early 1995, when Mr. Richards was contacted by Mr. 
Bardsley (Defendant's neighbor across the street, who became chairman of the 
Committee) and met with neighbors concerned about the construction, he was still 
disinterested or unwilling to act as an architectural committee and instead said 
that he believed that the neighbors should take over the responsibility.2 
6. Mr. Richards suggested to the concerned neighbors that he would 
resign and that they could choose a committee, which they did by documents 
prepared by Mr. Sackett and signed by Mr. Richards on February 7, 1995 
(Richards Depo., pp. 62, 63, 67). 
2
 Mr. Richards' answer: "Well, they expressed their concern. And they said, 'This 
lady from New York acquired this property to build' — I guess a vacation house was probably 
the way it was best put. To come out here because she likes to ski. 'And we're concerned as 
we are seeing the way it's going up. It's going to be out of character with the neighborhood.' 
And they wanted to know what I could do as chairman of the architectural committee. 
And I said - at that point I said, 1 would like to help you/ But I said, 1 don't even 
live in the neighborhood anymore'. And I said, Tm trying to build a house of my own. And 
sell a business'. And I said, It seems really more appropriate that I let some of the neighbors 
be the members of the architectural committee'." (Depo., p. 61, lines 6 to 21). 
6 
7. No suggestion or recommendation was made by either Mr. Richards 
or any interested neighbor that the appointment of a successor Committee be 
submitted to a vote of the lot owners, but Mr. Richards recognizes that this could 
have been an appropriate way of accomplishing the transition under the 
Covenants3. (Richards Depo., pp. 65, 66). 
8. Finally after the meetings and maneuvering, on February 16, 1995, 
Mr. Bardsley, as new Committee chairman for the first time notified Ms. 
Kabatznick about the Covenants, saying, "We have observed that extensive work 
is proceeding apace on major alternations and rebuilding" on her property and 
saying she had not submitted building plans to the Committee to review. (Letter 
is Exhibit II. to complaint). 
9. Ms. Kabatznick invested many thousands of dollars in visible 
construction of the new residence between December 1, 1994 and February 18, 
1995, when she received the Committee's letter and first became aware of the 
existence of the Covenants and of any claim there was an Architectural 
Committee, albeit newly formed, seeking to review her plans for harmony and 
conformity of external design and during this time interested neighbors who 
ended up on the Committee had noticed the construction proceeding apace and 
had remained completely silent and failed utterly to notify her or her builder, who 
was there on site nearly every day, until these neighbors completed the purported 
3
 Article I. provides, ".. . in the event the committee ceases to function, then fifty 
percent of the owners of the lots . . . shall have the right to elect a committee". 
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transition of power from Mr. Richards to their new Committee. (Burningham 
Depo., p. 14; Kabatznick Depo., p. 12; Bardsley Depo., p. 37). 
10. The Committee chairman, Mr. Bardsley, admits he is not an owner 
of land in the Subdivision (Bardsley Depo., p. 101). [Bardsley was the only 
member of the Committee identified in the complaint (R. 2)]. 
The Committee concedes on page 10 of its Brief, as it did before the trial 
court, that "the Committee is not a corporation, not a partnership, nor any similar 
formal legal entity, nor does it own any property in the Subdivision." The 
Committee also conceded in its memorandum in opposition to Kabatznick's 
motion to strike and renewed motion to dismiss, that the action does not involve 
members of the Committee personally, except as part of the Committee (R. 389) 
recognizing that the members are not parties in their individual capacity. 
HI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT "A". 
An unincorporated association is not a legal entity entitled to sue in its 
common name unless authorized by statute or court rule. Since no statute applies 
to an architectural committee created under restrictive covenants, authority to sue 
must be derived from Rule 17(d), which provides, "When two or more persons 
associated in any business . . . not a corporation, transact such business under a 
common name . . . they may sue or be sued by such common name." Under 
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Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Aff d 923 
P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996), two factors must be shown: (i) the parties were 
transacting business, and (ii) transacting such business under a common name. 
In this case Committee is unincorporated, not a partnership or similar legal 
entity, but only a creation under land covenants to review building plans for 
harmony of external design. It is not a business entity and conducts no business 
in its common name, nor does it hold itself out to the public as a business. Most 
importantly it was organized by a few neighbors, well after Kabatznick began 
constructing her home, for the purpose of commencing this action as a 
"committee" against her to enforce the Covenants. On these facts, it is surely not 
a business association authorized by Rule 17(d), to sue in a common name. 
Since the Committee was the sole plaintiff and was not authorized by 
statute or rule to sue in its common name, it lacked the capacity, authority or 
standing to commence an action resulting in a failure of jurisdiction at the outset 
and the action being a nullity, so no action remained within which to substitute 
other parties and the trial court's dismissal without leave to amend was proper. 
Haro v. Haro, 880 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1994). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT "B". 
Restrictive covenants are property interests that run with the land and 
generally only owners of the benefited land have standing to enforce the 
covenants. When the covenants create an architectural committee for the limited 
purpose of reviewing plans and, do not confer any right of enforcement on the 
9 
committee, but do expressly authorize enforcement by the land owners, the 
exclusion must have been intended. Thus, the Committee has no standing to 
enforce the Covenants on its own behalf. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT "C". 
An architectural committee created in land covenants with the limited 
purpose of reviewing plans, and not expressly authorized to sue on behalf of lot 
owners, has no authority, capacity or standing to sue in a representative capacity 
to enforce the covenants on behalf of land owners. This is particularly so in this 
case where the Covenants do not create any homeowners' association or 
association of lot owners, and under the Covenants the Committee is not elected 
or appointed by lot owners, but instead was appointed by a successor to the 
original developer. Therefore Committee has no standing to sue in a 
representative capacity on behalf of the lot owners. 
Committee also fails the test of associational standing in a representative 
capacity, under the Utah Rest Ass'n case, since it brought its action on behalf of 
residents of the Subdivision and residents have no standing, only lot owners. 
Also, the relief sought by the Committee was a mandatory injunction for removal 
of Kabatznick's home and only prospective injunctive relief is permitted in 
associational standing. Because mandatory injunctive relief was sought, individual 
participation by lot owners would be required to adjudicate Kabatznick's equitable 
defenses of laches, balance of equities, etc., which on the facts in this case are 
viable important defenses. Thus Committee fails completely the associational 
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standing test of Utah Rest Ass'n, and its action was properly dismissed for 
failure of jurisdiction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT "D". 
Since the failure of standing is jurisdictional, when a sole plaintiff has no 
standing, no action remains in which to substitute parties, so the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit substitution. Moreover there is no 
identity of interest between the Committee and lot owners or its members who 
happen to coincidentally be lot owners, sufficient for an amendment to benefit 
from the relation back doctrine under Rule 15(c). Since adding a new party 
amounts to asserting a new cause of action, no prejudice would be suffered by 
any lot owner in bringing their own action, so there was no abuse of discretion 
for failing to allow substitution. 
Committee also raised the issue of substitution under Rule 17(a) URCP, 
but for the first time on this appeal. Since it was never raised to the trial court 
and adequate opportunity existed for doing so after Kabatznick moved to dismiss 
for want of standing, this issue should not be considered by this Court. 
This Court should affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing 
Committee's complaint without prejudice on the merits, for want of jurisdiction 
for the Committee's lack of standing. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDING REQUIRES A PROPER PLAINTIFF THAT EXISTS AS 
A LEGAL ENTITY ENTITLED TO SUE IN ITS COMMON NAME 
BY STATUTE OR COURT RULE AND PLAINTIFF COMMITTEE 
FAILS THESE REQUIREMENTS AND ITS ACTION IS WITHOUT 
JURISDICTION AND IS A NULLITY THAT CANNOT BE 
AMENDED OR SUBSTITUTED. 
Standing which is jurisdictional requires a proper plaintiff entity that exists 
and is legally entitled to sue, since one of the fundamental elements of standing is 
that there be a justiciable controversy between actual parties with adverse 
interests; Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah 1983); Kennecott Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985); and see Utah Rest. Ass'n v. 
Davis Cty. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Utah 1985) (the court raises 
jurisdictional standing on its own, also notes that UCA §78-33-13 permits an 
unincorporated association or corporation to sue as a person for declaratory 
relief). 
The Committee cited UCA §78-33-13 to the trial court as authority that 
unincorporated associations are entitled to sue at least for declaratory relief and 
even though it sued for injunctive relief, it said this shows there is no per se 
proscription against such entities suing. However, the Utah Declaratory Judgment 
Act does not define "unincorporated associations" nor provide any authorization 
to sue in a common name, and contrary to the Committee's assertion, it is not a 
legal entity authorized by statute, rule or otherwise to sue or maintain an action in 
its common fictitious name. 
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It is well established that jurisdiction requires a plaintiff commencing an 
action to have an actual existence either as a natural person or artificial person 
recognized as a legal entity. 59 Am.Jur.2d, "Parties", §20 (1987) [numerous 
citations omitted]. It is also well established that in the absence of an enabling or 
permissive statute or rule of practice an unincorporated association, society, or 
club, cannot sue or be sued in the organization's own name, and the reason is that 
absent such statute or rule, the organization is not a legal entity separate from its 
members, so an action must be brought by the members. 6 Am.Jur.2d, 
"Associations and Clubs", §5. 
Utah decisions are in accord with these principles, Disabled Am. Veterans 
v. Hendrixson, 340 P.2d 416 (Utah 1959) (Rule 17(d) doesn't authorize an 
unincorporated association to sue in its common name, only to be sued); Wall 
Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979) (permitting 
a limited partnership to sue in its name without joinder of its individual partners 
because specific statutes recognize the partnership as an entity distinct from its 
partners); Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 540 
(Utah 1983) (management committee authorized to sue by statute); and 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 500, 501 (Utah 1988) (holding 
business joint venture had standing to sue in its name without joining its 
individual members because statute treated it as a partnership entity separate and 
distinct from its members and Rule 17(d) URCP permitted it to be sued in its 
common name). 
13 
The holding in Cottonwood Mall Co., resulted in a 1991 amendment of 
Rule 17(d), which now provides, "When two or more persons associated in any 
business . . . not a corporation, transact such business under a common name . . . 
they may sue or be sued by such common name." 
This expanded authorization for an unincorporated association to sue in its 
common name, was recently considered in Hebertson v. Willow creek Plaza, 895 
P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Affd 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996). The Supreme 
Court in affirming stated, "Clearly the rule contemplates two factors: (i) parties 
transacting business, and (ii) transacting such business under a common name." 
923 P.2d at 1391. The Court held that even though the parties were doing 
business as a joint venture owning real property known as Willowcreek Plaza, 
they were not doing business under that common name and could not be sued 
under that name. The factors the Court of Appeals deemed appropriate to 
determine if an entity is doing business for jurisdictional purposes of the rule, 
included whether they had local offices, the presence of employees, whether they 
held themselves out as a business, whether they owned real or personal property. 
Hebertsen, 895 P.2d at 840. 
In this case, the Committee admits that it is not a corporation, not a 
partnership or any other similar formal legal entity, nor does it own any property 
in the Subdivision. It says that it is only a creation under the original Covenants 
formed to see that certain aspects of the requirements were adhered to by those 
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residing in the Subdivision.4 But the Covenants named one person as the 
"architectural committee", who was not the declarant (creator) of the Subdivision, 
who could appoint other members if he desired who need not be owners or 
residents. 
This person could hardly be said to constitute an association or entity 
separate and distinct from himself and he certainly was the only "Committee" for 
almost 30 years from the inception of the Subdivision in 1966 until after 
Kabatznick's home construction had ensued for months until it ripened into a 
dispute involving her immediate neighbors in February 1995, when these 
neighbors solicited Mr. Richards to resign and appoint them as members so they 
could enforce their perceived interests against Kabatznick via the so-called 
"Committee". Under Article I. of the Covenants, if the architectural committee 
ceases to function, then fifty percent (50%) of the lot owners have the right to 
elect a successor committee. These neighbors decided to circumvent this 
democratic requirement for their own purpose, choosing not to hold an election 
which would have been inconvenient given their desire to enforce their rights via 
a committee5. 
4
 Committee's Brief, p. 10. 
5
 Kabatznick contends that this one-man "committee" ceased to function or exist ten 
years prior to the so called "appointment of a successor committee" because Mr. Richards 
moved from the Subdivision and ceased having any interest, financially, personally or 
otherwise, so he had no lawful right to appoint a successor. This was the result in Smith v. 
First Sav. of Louisiana F.S.A., 575 So.2d 1033 (Ala. 1991); and see B.B.P. Corp. v. Carroll, 
760 P.2d 519, 523 (Alaska 1988) (failure to hold election of lot owners rendered action 
invalid). At least it is undisputed that when he observed Kabatznick's house construction and 
knew that he had not reviewed any plan or given any approval, he was uninterested and 
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Under the admitted facts here, plaintiff Committee is surely not the kind of 
entity envisioned by Rule 17(d) as authorized to sue in a common name, not only 
because it is not a business entity and conducts no business in its common name 
or otherwise, has no local office, nor holds itself out to the public as a business 
entity, nor has real or personal property in its common name, but more 
fundamentally because it was organized well after Kabatznick began construction 
of her home solely for the purpose of the dispute with her and to bring and 
maintain this action as a committee against her. No court should recognize the 
standing of a purported committee of a few persons claiming to be a genuine 
association and separate legal entity capable of suing in a fictitious name under 
these illegitimate circumstances. 
In this case where the sole plaintiff, the Committee, is not a natural person 
or legal entity authorized by statute or rule to sue, as with the failure of other 
requirements of standing, it is jurisdictional and the action is held to be a mere 
nullity, since there is no case in court and consequently nothing to amend or 
substitute. 59 Am.Jur.2d, "Parties", §20 (1987); Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza; 
Haro v. Haro, 880 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1994) (dismissal proper since estate was 
not a party authorized by statute to bring a wrongful death action, and Rule 17(a) 
motion to substitute decedents' heirs as real parties in interest properly denied 
since the suit was a nullity and there was no case that remained in which to 
substitute parties); Jenkins v. Estate of Thomas, 800 P.2d 1358 (Colo. App. 
disinclined to do anything but ignore it. 
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1990) (dismissal of case and denial of motion to substitute party was proper since 
defendant estate was not a legal entity so there was no controversy between 
actual parties and no subject matter jurisdiction); in accord, People in Interest of 
RDS, 514 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1973); Group of Ten., Grandview Homes v. Mar-Len 
Rlty., Inc., 321 N.E.2d. 241 (Ohio App. 1974) (a group of tenants with 
unidentified members is not an association sufficient to constitute a legal entity or 
an identifiable plaintiff essential to the existence of an action). 
B. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ARE PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 
SERVITUDES THAT RUN WITH THE LAND AND ONLY LAND 
OWNERS AND THEIR SUCCESSORS IN OWNERSHIP HAVE A 
RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE RESTRICTIONS AND WHEN THE 
COVENANTS EXPRESSLY CONFER THE RIGHT OF 
ENFORCEMENT ONLY UPON LAND OWNERS, IN NO EVENT 
CAN A COMMITTEE CREATED UNDER THE SAME 
COVENANTS HAVE STANDING TO SUE. 
Restrictive covenants of the type involved here, created and recorded by an 
original grantor owning title to the subdivision land to mutually burden and 
benefit the lots with uniform building and use restrictions are generally held 
enforceable by and against subsequent grantees as property rights or equitable 
servitudes that run with the land. 20 Am.Jur.2d, "Covenants, etc.", §151 (1995). 
Because they are interests that run with the land, generally a suit for equitable 
enforcement is only maintainable by an owner of the benefited land. Id. at §251 
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(1995); Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781 (Utah 1946), approving this general 
principle of land covenants; Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)6. 
Limiting the right of enforcement to only owners of the benefited property 
is consistent with the general requirements of standing involving rights or 
interests in real property. Blodgett v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah 
App. 1988) (party having no interest in the land held not to meet the standing 
requirement of Terracor. v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986), 
since it could suffer no injury absent an interest in the property; Andrus v. 
Bagley, 775 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989) (party having deeded property interest to his 
mother had no standing respecting the interest). 
Finally as with contracts generally and with respect to land covenants with 
even greater force, since the rights, burden and benefits run with the land, no 
person not in direct privity or a successor land owner as the intended third-party 
beneficiary, can enforce the restrictions unless such intention appears from the 
creating instrument expressly or by fair implication. 20 Am.Jur.2d, "Covenants, 
etc.", §256 (1995). So when the instrument creating the covenants only confers 
the right to enforce them upon land owners by its express terms such limitation is 
equally binding and limits standing and the right to enforce the covenants to the 
owners of the property, depriving strangers or others of such right. Id. at §257. 
6
 While Fink v. Miller did not involve an issue of an architectural committee or other 
non-land owner's standing to enforce the restrictive covenants, nonetheless, the general 
proposition that land owners have the right and interest to enforce such covenants is correctly 
set forth and an architectural committee was involved and denied approval, but only land 
owners sued. 
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Thus an association of property owners which does not own any property 
in a development does not have the right to enforce the Covenants where the 
developer has granted the right of enforcement to owners of lots but does not 
authorize the association to enforce the restrictions itself or as an agent of the lot 
owners. Id. at §253, citing, Beech ML Prop. Owners' Ass'n. v. Current, 240 
S.E.2d 503 (N.C. App. 1978). Reaching the same result Palm Pt. Property 
Owners' v. Pisarski, 626 So.2d 195 (Ha. 1993), even where the homeowners' 
association was created as a part of the restrictive covenants no standing to 
enforce them is conferred where the covenants only authorized owners of 
property in the subdivision to enforce them. 
In this case the Covenants relied on by the Committee for standing to sue 
for injunctive relief only provide for enforcement under Article XIII., which 
states: 
If the parties hereto, any of them, or their heirs, or assigns, 
shall violate or attempt to violate any of the Covenants herein, it 
shall be lawful for any other person or persons owning any real 
property situated in said tract, to prosecute any proceedings at 
law or in equity against the person or persons violating or 
attempting to violate any such Covenant, and either to prevent him 
or them from so doing [or] to recover damages or the[ilr dues for 
such violation. [Emphasis Added]. 
This provision plainly confers the right to enforce the Covenants only upon 
owners of the benefited property. While Article I. is the only place in the 
Covenants where an architectural committee is designated, composed or 
discussed, the committee is only empowered to review building plans and 
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specifications to determine if they are in conformity and harmony of external 
design with existing structures. Provision is made for deemed approval of plans 
if they are submitted to the committee and no approval or rejection is 
forthcoming within thirty days. There is no requirement that members need be 
owners of land in the Subdivision, but no right either expressly or impliedly is 
conferred upon the committee under Article I. to enforce the Covenants if plans 
are not submitted or if any other violations occur. 
Since the limited function of the architectural committee is set forth clearly 
in Article I. of the Covenants and the Committee is not mentioned elsewhere, and 
since the right to sue to enforce the Covenants is specifically and only provided 
in Article XIII. which confers such right solely on land owners in the tract, under 
established rules of contract construction the developer must have intended that 
only property owners are entitled to sue to enforce the Covenants, to the 
exclusion of the architectural committee. Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d 389, 
392 (Utah 1963) (under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius [express 
mention of one thing implies exclusion of others], a statute authorizing a wife to 
sue her husband respecting property rights, containing no reference to personal 
injury actions, is interpreted as excluding the latter by intendment); 17A 
Am.Jur.2d., "Contracts", §379 (1991). This of course makes the Covenants 
consistent with the general case law, that covenants may only be enforced by land 
owners. 
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Thus the Committee's claim that it has a right to sue for injunctive relief as 
a party in interest is completely unavailing and inconsistent with the numerous 
court decisions and even the express term in the Covenants conferring such right 
of enforcement solely on lot owners. Accordingly no doubt can exist that the 
Committee has no standing in its own right to enforce the Covenants. 
C. ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE HAS NO STANDING TO SUE IN 
A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF LOT 
OWNERS OR RESIDENTS OF THE SUBDIVISION SINCE IT IS 
NOT AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE, RULE OR BY THE 
COVENANTS. 
The Committee's Brief argues in III. A. that it has standing to sue to 
enforce the Covenants under a specific case, Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. 
of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985). The Committee does not say if it cites 
this case to support a claim of standing to sue in its own right or only in a 
representative capacity. But since the case deals with an incorporated voluntary 
trade association's right to sue on behalf of its members to challenge a public law, 
it can only be relevant to standing in a representative capacity. 
Of course the Committee does not say why standing in Utah Rest Ass'n is 
particularly applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, but apparently 
it has fixed upon this case as defining its claimed right or the failure thereof in 
this action. This is incredible considering that standing depends upon many 
factors including the public or private nature of the claims and it is impossible to 
articulate a universal litmus test for standing in different circumstances. Soc. of 
Prof. Journalists, 743 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 1987) ("It is difficult to make 
21 
useful all inclusive generalizations that determine whether standing exists in any 
given case, since the issue often depends on the facts of each case/'). 
In cases involving private contracts or property interests between private 
litigants not involving a challenge to the validity of public laws or other issues of 
public importance, standing generally requires only that the plaintiff be the party 
having title and the right to enforce the claim.7 
While Utah has no case where a management committee created by 
restrictive covenants with a limited purpose of reviewing plans, attempted to 
bring an action on behalf of lot owners to enforce their right to injunctive relief, 
the Supreme Court has considered standing in a similar context. In Brickyard 
Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983) an action was 
brought by a condominium association's management committee on its own 
behalf and on behalf of unit owners against the project developer to recover 
damages for defects in the common areas owned by the association and for 
defects in the various units. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim for lack of standing or capacity to sue and upon interlocutory appeal, the 
Court in a lengthy analysis upheld the management committee's standing to sue 
7
 Shire Dev. v. Frontier Invs., 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990) (in contract actions 
only parties or intended beneficiaries have standing to sue and a joint venture not having a 
written assignment of a real estate contract has no standing to enforce the contract or to claim 
benefits based on it). In cases involving ownership of real property or rights derived 
therefrom, a party must have an interest in the land or it has no standing. Blodgett v. Zions 
First Nat. Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1988); Andrus v. Bagley, 775 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1989); Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan, 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979) (even though a 
shareholder owns all stock in a corporation, such fact does not authorize him to sue as an 
individual for wrong done by a third party to the corporation, the corporation has standing). 
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on behalf of the unit owners, because the committee had express authorization by 
statute under the Utah Condominium Ownership Act. 
In reaching the decision the Court considered some cases that denied such 
standing to a condominium management committee, but they were distinguished 
on the basis that these associations had no statutory authority, nor did it appear 
that there was express authority to represent the owners in the declaration or by-
laws. Hendler v. Rogers House Condominium, Inc., Flo., 234 So.2d 128 
(1970); Summerhouse, etc., v. Majestic Savings & Loan, 44 Colo.App. 495, 615 
P.2d 71 (1980). Id. at 541. 
The Court also considered defendant's argument that it was entitled to have 
the action result in a judgment binding on represented unit owners to preclude 
further litigation under the doctrine of res judicata. The Court determined that 
defendant had this important right, but said unlike different lot owners in a 
residential subdivision, who are entitled to separately enforce the restrictive 
covenants, citing Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Condominium Act would preclude unit owners from bringing their own separate 
action on the same claim made by the management committee, so res judicata 
would fully apply. Id. at 541, 542. 
In this case the distinguishing factors and policy concerns addressed in the 
Brickyard case require a contrary result. The absence of statutory or rule 
authorization is fatal to the Committee's standing. The Committee does not own 
any property in its own right and there is no association of lot owners created 
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under the Covenants, expressly or impliedly, let alone one that resembles the 
statutory scheme for condominium associations, and the Covenants in this case do 
not expressly or impliedly authorize the Committee to represent lot owners or 
residents in bringing a suit. 
The Committee's assertion that the architectural committee created under 
the Covenants was intended to provide a means of protection for the Subdivision 
residents is simply not true. Covenant I. appointing the president of the 
Subdivision developer as the only member of the architectural committee, who 
was not appointed by the lot owners or residents and could not be removed by 
them, was plainly for the direct benefit of the developer and the protection of his 
resale values and not for the benefit of the individual residents. See Smith v. 
First Sav. of Louisiana F.S.A., 575 So.2d 1033 (Ala. 1991); Palermo v. Allen, 
369 P.2d 906 (Ariz. 1962). 
Absent statutory authorization to sue in a representative capacity invoking 
Brickyard's statutory privity for res judicata or express authorization of the 
Committee under the Covenants to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of 
lot owners, under Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978) any final 
judgment by the Committee in a representative capacity would not be binding 
upon or preclude subsequent actions by lot owners. Ruffinengo held that an 
unsuccessful prior suit to final judgment by lot owners to enforce the restrictive 
covenants did not bar a subsequent suit by a different lot owner, because 
subdivision lot owners do not stand in privity of contract or estate for issue 
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preclusion (collateral estoppel). Id. at 343, 344. Under the Brickyard case, this 
is fatal to the Committee's standing in a representative capacity in this action. 
Finally, cases from other jurisdictions have flatly rejected the right or 
standing of a homeowners' association, even organized formally under the 
restrictive covenants, to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of the property 
owners to redress a violation of the covenants, where the covenants did not 
expressly confer such right and there is no statutory authorization conferring 
standing upon the association. Palm Pt Property Owners' v. Pisarski, 626 So.2d 
195, 196 (Ha. 1993) (holding it inappropriate to expand associational standing 
rules that permit voluntary trade associations to challenge public laws, to permit 
enforcement of land restrictive covenants by a subdivision homeowners' 
association created in the covenants but not expressly authorized to sue on behalf 
of the lot owners); Beech ML Prop. Owners' Ass'n. v. Current, 240 S.E.2d 503 
(N.C. App. 1978); Friendly Village Com. Ass'n v. Silva & Hill Const Co., 31 
CaLApp. 3rd 220, 107 CaLRptr. 123 (1973); Summerhouse, etc., v. Majestic 
Savings & Loan, 44 Colo.App. 495, 615 P.2d 71 (1980); cf., Conestoga Pines 
Homeowners' Ass % Inc. v. Black, 689 P.2d 1176, 1177 (Colo.App. 1984) 
(permitting an action by an incorporated homeowners' association where the 
association's express purpose enunciated in the by-laws was to enforce the 
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covenants on behalf of its members and to take action necessary to protect the 
value of its members' property.8 
Turning now to Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 
1159 (Utah 1985), which involved a voluntary membership trade association's 
(non-profit corporation) challenge to a public law on behalf of its restaurant 
operator/members. There has been a modem trend of courts to recognize standing 
of socially important associations to challenge public laws that affect their 
membership, which has little to do with standing in the assertion of private 
contract or property rights between private litigants, that are involved here. 
Nonetheless, even under the general standards set forth in Utah Rest. Ass'n the 
Committee fails completely to have standing. 
The first requirement is that the individual members of the association 
have standing to sue. The Committee claims this is satisfied here because 
property owners have standing to sue, but it fails to recognize that it brought the 
action on behalf of the Subdivision "residents" not owners, and residents have no 
standing (see Argument "B" supra), so it fails the first test. But even if it had, it 
is not authorized to represent property owners in the Subdivision, either expressly 
or impliedly under the Covenants, and they are not the members of the 
Committee. It is only a coincident that two or three members, unnamed in the 
8
 The Committee cites this case on page 12, footnote 6 of its Brief, claiming it is 
similar or analogous. However it clearly is not, since it was a formal homeowners' 
association with voluntary membership and express provisions authorizing it to enforce the 
restrictive covenants on behalf of its member owners, who voted to bring the action. 
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complaint, may actually own property in the Subdivision since ownership or even 
residency is not a requirement or a criteria for appointment of members to the 
architectural committee, who are not elected by owners or residents of the 
Subdivision or authorized in any way to act on their behalf. 
Of course this most fundamental basis for the right to bring an action in a 
representative capacity, i.e., authorization, is not directly considered in Utah Rest. 
Ass'n because it was not raised as an issue.9 But, it is a well established general 
rule that no one is authorized to use the name of another or to sue on behalf of 
another or to join another as a plaintiff without his or her assent given in fact or 
by legal intendment via statute or otherwise and such consent and authorization is 
not lightly inferred. 59 AmJur.2d, "Parties'', §23 (1987). 
Kabatznick has pointed out before, that the Covenants do not confer any 
right of enforcement upon the architectural committee to sue on behalf of lot 
owners. Indeed the right to enforce the Covenants is specifically conferred upon 
lot owners, which under basic contract interpretation would be to the exclusion of 
a committee created in the same very short document (see Argument "B" supra), 
and such right may not be expanded by implication10. Moreover, contrary to the 
9
 Unlike the Brickyard case the standing issue was raised on appeal by the court not 
by the parties, still the court briefly touches upon the right and adequacy of plaintiffs 
representation of members. Id. at 1163. 
10
 Analyzed in the Brickyard case by distinguishing other cases where no authorization 
in by-laws or articles of homeowner's associations expressly conferred a right of enforcement 
in a representative capacity; and in Palm Pt. Property Owner's v. Pisarski, 626 So.2d 195 
(Fla. 1993), deciding not to expand associational standing, though plaintiff was a real 
homeowner's association created under the covenants but was not expressly authorized to 
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Committee's assertion that a right of enforcement is implied or the committee's 
function under the Covenants as a plan reviewing entity would be meaningless, 
Utah cases hold that an architectural committee is not essential to the covenants 
and the standard set forth can still be enforced by land owners even when the 
committee ceases to function, because this only dispenses with the requirement 
for prior plan approval not with the requirement to abide by the standard. 
Freeman v. Gee, 423 P.2d 155 (Utah 1967); Schick v. Perry, 364 P.2d 116 (Utah 
1961). 
The second requirement of Utah Rest Ass 'n that the nature of the claims 
and relief sought do not require the participation of individual members, is 
conclusively not present here. First, in actions challenging the validity of public 
laws, title or ownership to the claim, important for standing in enforcement of 
rights between private litigants for issue preclusion, are not important since issue 
preclusion would not bar relitigation by other members of the public who could 
show some injury not suffered by the public at large. But this was an important 
factor for standing in a representative capacity in the Brickyard case, and it is 
absent here without requiring the individual lot owners to sue. Even Utah Rest 
enforce them on behalf of owners, partly because restrictive covenants are not construed to 
expand their provisions, since the free and unrestricted use of property is favored at law. 
This is a standard rule of construction of land covenants, adopted in Utah as well. Parrish v. 
Richards, 336 R2d 122, 123 (Utah 1959). See also Turner v. Hi-Country Home Owner's 
Ass'n, 910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996), the contract between a homeowner's association in a 
subdivision and its members consist of the articles and by-laws, which are interpreted by their 
terms without addition, deletion or modification. There are no articles or by-laws or rules of 
the Committee, just the Covenants. 
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Ass'n recognized that members' claims for damages did not belong to the 
association since they had not been assigned to it, so it was not the owner of 
these claims and had no standing to assert them on behalf of the members, and 
even though these claims were prosecuted to judgment in the trial court, it was 
reversed for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for dismissal (not joinder), and the 
Court said each member must bring its own action or a class action could be filed 
under Rule 23(b)(3) URCP. Id. at 1163. 
Second, the Committee doesn't seek only an injunction of prospective 
application, which was the only specific relief recognized in Warth v. Seldin, 95 
S. Ct. 2197, 2213 (1975); it seeks a mandatory injunction as well While Utah 
Rest Ass'n involved only prospective injunctive relief, since the Court's 
associational standing was predicated on Warth, it follows that it would also hold 
that only prospective injunctive relief is appropriate and not mandatory injunctive 
relief. 
Kabatznick presented additional facts outside the pleadings, not just to 
show that the Committee is not a real entity and was created solely for the 
purpose of harassing and enforcing alleged rights against her, but also to show 
that the few interested neighbors watched while she spent thousands of dollars 
building her house knowing she hadn't submitted plans to anyone for approval 
and waiting until they could seize power as a committee for at least two months 
before giving her any notice of the existence of the Covenants and their claim to 
require prior plan approval. 
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Because the Committee seeks a mandatory injunction for the removal of 
Kabatznick's home, these fact clearly establish the viability of her asserted 
affirmative defenses of laches, estoppel and balance of equities to such injunctive 
relief and these defenses absolutely depend upon the particular party suing and 
require individual participation for proper resolution. See Papanikolas Bros. Ent. 
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr., 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975); Crimmins v. 
Simmons, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981); Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165 (Utah App. 
1993); and, Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622 (Utah App. 1993). 
Accordingly, there is surely no basis for finding any standing in the 
Committee in a representative capacity and the trial court properly dismissed the 
action for want of jurisdiction, where it was the sole plaintiff. 
D. WHEN THE SOLE PLAINTIFF LACKS CAPACITY AND 
STANDING TO SUE DEPRIVING THE COURT OF 
JURISDICTION, THE COURT DOES NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO PERMIT JOINDER OF NEW 
PARTIES, ASSERTING NEW CAUSES OF ACTION WHICH DO 
NOT RELATE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL ACTION. 
The Committee argues that even if the Committee lacks standing that the 
court abused its discretion in not permitting some individual property owners, 
claimed to be members of the Committee, to join and be substituted as new 
parties plaintiff to continue the action. Committee cites Rule 15(a) and Rule 
17(a) URCP as compelling such result. Kabatznick first notes that the Committee 
raised the issue and argument about Rule 17(a) for the first time in this appeal, it 
was never cited or raised to the trial court at any stage, so the court had no 
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opportunity to consider or rule on it, and accordingly this Court should refuse to 
consider this issue and argument. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 
850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). In any event, the Committee misapprehends the 
application of both rules in the circumstances and the trial court's denial of 
Committee's motion to amend to permit new parties to be substituted was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Kabatznick does not dispute that Rule 15(a) URCP provides that a party 
may amend its pleadings with leave of court and that leave shall be freely given. 
But since the rule permits a party to amend, it would seem inapplicable to a 
complete substitution of the only plaintiff for another, which is provided for 
under Rule 25 upon death of a party, incompetency, or transfer of an interest 
during the pendency of the case. But if an amendment is permissible under Rule 
15(a) to substitute a new party (not a successor) for the only plaintiff, then the 
salutary purpose for amending as opposed to filing a new action, would be to 
obtain the benefit of Rule 15(c) URCP which permits amendments to relate back 
to the filing of the original complaint. 
The Committee recognizes this, but this benefit is not available to any 
individual property owner sought to be substituted by the Committee as a new 
plaintiff, since absent an identity in interest between the new and former party, 
Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds new parties 
for those brought before the court by the original pleadings — whether plaintiff or 
defendant, because such amendment amounts to the assertion of a new cause of 
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action. Doxey - Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). The 
application of Rule 15(c) can allow a plaintiff to cure defects in naming 
defendants in the original compliant without suffering a bar by the running of the 
statute of limitations, so the determination of whether an amended complaint 
relates back generally comes up in this context. Russell v. The Standard Corp., 
898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995). 
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984) 
the court said: 
Identity of interest as used in this context means that the parties are 
so closely related in their business operations that notice of the 
action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the other. 
Such identity exists for example between past and present forms of 
the same enterprise. 
But Perry held there was no such identity of interest where the plaintiff 
sued the supplier claiming breach of warranty for defective doors, then 
subsequently moved to amend the complaint to add the manufacturer with the 
same factual allegations and same claim for relief, because privity of contract 
between the manufacturer and supplier was insufficient to constitute an identity of 
interest so there was no relation back of the amendments and it amounted to a 
new cause of action barred by the statute of limitations. 
There is no identity of interest between the Committee and individual lot 
owners, even any who were members of the Committee, since the action was not 
commenced in any individual capacity by any named lot owners, but solely in the 
name of the Committee as an entity purporting to represent all residents of the 
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Subdivision. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) holding that the 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend a counterclaim 
raising essentially identical allegations as those in the original counterclaim, 
where an individual was a plaintiff in the original action only in his capacity as 
trustee and not individually, so defendants could not counterclaim against him 
personally since this would require a new complaint or a third-party complaint. 
Id. at 1383. 
Each lot owners' cause of action to enforce the Covenants is separate and 
distinct to the particular owner, even though the factual allegations and relief 
sought may be identical. Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978) holding 
that an unsuccessful prior suit by lot owners to enforce restrictive covenants did 
not bar a subsequent suit by another lot owner even though the factual claims and 
relief sought were nearly identical, because lot owners do not stand in privity of 
contract or estate so collateral estoppel does not preclude subsequent actions. Id. 
at 343, 344. The court even noted that it was not at all unforeseeable that plaintiff 
Ruffinengo might reach a different result than did the other lot owners in the 
prior suit simply because he may present a far more convincing case. Id. at 344. 
Since there is no identity of interest between any lot owner and the 
Committee, adding a lot owner in substitution for Committee would amount to 
the assertion of a new cause of action which would not relate back under Rule 
15(c) to the Committee's complaint, and would require the adjudication as to each 
new lot owner of Kabatznick's equitable defenses of laches, estoppel, balance of 
equities, etc. Therefore no prejudice would be suffered by any lot owner in filing 
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a new action, indeed the Committee advised the trial court that it intended to do 
just that (R. 486). So the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
without prejudice, but without permitting substitution. Of course Kabatznick 
contends that the better view is since standing is jurisdictional, when the sole 
plaintiff lacks standing, the court is without jurisdiction and the action is a nullity 
from the outset and there is no remaining action in which to substitute or add 
parties. See Argument "A" supra. 
As to the Committee's argument on Rule 17(a), in Haro v. Haro, 880 P.2d 
878 (Utah App. 1994) an estate brought a wrongful death action on its own 
behalf and defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that Utah's wrongful death 
statute only authorized an action by the heirs or the personal representative for 
the benefit of the heirs. Plaintiff/estate then moved pursuant to Rule 17(a) URCP 
to substitute the heirs as the real parties in interest, but the trial court dismissed 
the action and refused to grant the motion to substitute the heirs. In affirming, 
the Court of Appeals said, 
This rule [17(a)] contemplates that the party bringing suit has the 
capacity to sue on behalf of the 'real party in interest.' If the suit is 
brought by a party that does not have the capacity to sue on behalf 
of the 'real party in interest,' the suit is a nullity. Because Martin 
Haro's estate had no capacity to bring an action for wrongful death, 
the complaint was a nullity and there remained no cause of action in 
which to substitute parties. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 
denying plaintiffs motion to substitute real parties in interest. Id. at 
880. 
In this case, the Committee plainly had no statutory, rule or other authority 
under the Covenants or otherwise to commence an action in a representative 
34 
capacity on behalf of the residents or owners of the Subdivision and therefore 
lacks standing to assert such claims in a representative capacity and the court was 
deprived of jurisdiction and since the Committee was the sole plaintiff, the action 
was a nullity and nothing remained in which to substitute parties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Architectural Committee is not a legal entity authorized by statute 
to sue in a common name and is not a business entity, nor does it transact 
business in its common name or hold itself out to the public as doing business 
under a common name, so it lacks authorization and capacity to sue under Rule 
17(d) URCP. Accordingly, no jurisdiction was conferred on the trial court and 
the action was a nullity required to be dismissed without leave to amend or 
substitute. Alternatively, the Committee having no statutory, rule, or express or 
implied authorization under the Covenants to sue in its own behalf or in a 
representative capacity on behalf of lot owners to enforce the Covenants, it fails 
completely to have standing, causing a failure of jurisdiction. The trial court 
correctly dismissed for want of jurisdiction and without leave to amend to 
substitute new parties asserting a new cause of action and such dismissal and 
result should be affirmed by this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 24th day of June, 1997. 
^ ^ 1 L BENSON MABEY ' J^"^ ^> 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & M A B E Y ^ - ^ 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Amy E. Kabatznick 
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MOUNT OLYMPUS PARK, INC. a corporation of Utah, with its principal 
place of business in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, the owners of 
the following described real property situated in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, to-wit: 
Lots 2 through 49 MOUNT OLYMPUS COVE NO. 3 SUBDIVISION, a 
subdivision of Salt Lake County, Utah, according to the 
official plat thereof on file and of record at the office 
of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Does hereby place the hereinafter designated restrictive covenants upon all of 
the lots of said subdivision except Lot No. 1, which shall not be restricted 
nor controlled by said covenants because it is intended as a Church site. 
I 
Lots 2 through 29 shall be know as "residential lots". No 
structure shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any 
"residential lot" other than one detached single family dwelling, a private 
garage, a guest house and outbuildings for pets as hereinafter described. 
No residential structure, nor any part thereof shall be erected, 
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any percel of land containing less 
than an entire residential lot, unless said parcel shall have a width of at 
least 90 feet at the front building setback line. 
No building shall be erected, placed, or altered on any premises 
in said development until the building plans, specifications, and plot plan 
showing the location of such building have been approved as to conformity 
and harmony of external design with existing structures in the development, 
and as to location of the building with respect to topography and finished 
groung elevation by an architectural committee composed of DAVID K. RICHARDS 
and other members selected by him or by a representative designated by the 
members of said committee. In the event of death or resignation of any mem-
bers of said committee, the remaining member, or members, shall have full 
authority to approve or disapprove such design and location, or to designate 
a representative with like authority. In the event all the members of said 
committee die or in the event the committee ceases to function then 50% of the 
owners of the lots in said subdivision shall have the right to elect a committee. 
In event said committee, or its designated representantive fails to approve or 
disapprove such design and location 30 days after said plans and specifications 
have been submitted to it, or in any event, if no suit to enjoin the erection 
of such building or the making of such alterations have been commenced prior to 
the completion thereof, such approval will not be required and this covenant 
will be deemed to have been fully complied with. Neither the members of such 
committee, nor its designated representative shall be entitled to any compen-
sation for services performed pursuant to this Covenant. This committee 
shall have the right to vary the requirements as set forth on Section II, but 









Every detached single family dwelling erected on any one of the 
above described residential lots shall have a minimum area above the ground 
of 1500 square feet, exclusive of garages and open porches. 
Ill 
No outbuilding shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to 
remain nearer than eight (8) feet to either side line of a lot unless no 
portion of siad building extends nearer to the street line than sixty-five 
(65) feet. 
No driveway shall bypass a residential structure on a side having 
a side yard of less than ten (10) feet between the principal residential 
structure and the property line of the adjacent owner. 
IV 
No residential structure shall be erected or placed on any build-
ing site, which has an area of less than 8,000 square feet. 
V 
No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on upon 
any building site nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or become 
an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood. 
VI 
No trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding 
erected on a building site covered by these Covenants shall at any time be 
used for human habitation temporarily or permanently, nor shall any structure 
of a temporary character be used for human habitation. 
VII 
Easements are reserved as shown on the recorded plat for ut i l i ty 
installation, pipelines, ditches, and maintenance. Nothing in this paragraph 
contained shall be interpreted as prohibiting construction of walks, driveways 
porches, etc., over such easements, subject to the rights of those with ease-
ments to make necessary repairs and conduct necessary maintenance along such 
easements. 
V I I I 
No animals or poultry of any kind other than house pets shall be 








No fence or wall shall be erected, placed or altered on any lot 
nearer to any street than the minimum building setback line unless approval 
as hereinafter set forth. 
No fence, walls, or hedge over six (6) feet in height shall be 
erected or grbwn at any place on said premises; provided, however, that the 
restrictions set forth in this section may be waived or nullified by the 
owners of more than fifty per cent (50%) of the numbered lots within this 
subdivision obtained in writing. 
X 
No structure shall be moved onto any residential building site 
hereinbefore described or any part thereof unless it meets with the approval 
of one hundred per cent (100%) of the fee title holders of other lots in 
this subdivision, such approval to be given in writing. 
XI 
No sign of any kind shall be displayed to the public view on any lot 
except one professional sign of not more than one square foot; one sign of not 
more than five square feet advertising the property for sale or rent, or signs 
used by a builder to advertise the property during construction and sales 
period. 
XII 
Oil drilling, oil development operations; refining mining operations 
of any kind, or quarrying shall not be permitted upon or in any of the building 
sites in the tract described herein, nor shall oil wells, tanks, tunnels, 
mineral excavations or shafts permitted upon or in any of the building sites 
covered by these Covenants. 
XIII 
No lot shall be used or maintained as a dumping ground for rubbish, 
trash, garbage or other waste shall not be kept except in sanitary containers. 
All incinerators or other equipment for the storage or disposal of such 
material shall be kept in a clean and sanitary condition. 
These Covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on 
all parties and all persons claiming under them until January 1, 1994 at 
which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive 
periods of 10 years unless by vote of a majority of the then owners of the 
building sites covered by these Covenants it is agreed to change said 
covenants in whole or in part. 
If the parties hereto, any of them, or their heirs, or assigns, 
shall violate or attempt to violate any of the Covenants here/in, it shall be 






said tract, to prosecute any proceedings at law or in equity against the person 
or persons violating or attemping to violate any such Covenant, and either to 
prevent him or them from so doingor to recover damages or ther dues for such 
violation. 
XV 
Invalidation of any one of these Covenants or any part thereof by 
judgements or/court order shall in no wise affect any of the other provisions 
which shall remain in full force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the officers of the MOUNT OLYMPUS PARK, 
INCORPORATED have here unto subscribed their names this 10th day of 
May 1966. 
MOUNT OLYMPUS PARK, INC. 
by: DAVID K. RICAHARDS 
PRESIDENT 
by: CAROLYN B. STRONG 
SECRETARY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Mary G. Taylor, a Notary Public, hereby certify that on the 10th day of 
May, 1965 personally appeared before me, DAVID K. RICHARDS and CAROLYN B. 
STRONG, who being first duly sworn, did depose and say that DAVID K, RICHARDS 
is the President and CAROLYN B. STRONG is the secretary of MOUNT OLYMPUS 
PARK INC. and that the foregoing document was signed pursuant to resolutions 
of their Boards of Directors at which time a quorum was present. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereto set my hands and seal this 10th 
day of May 1966. 
Mary G. Taylor Bountiful, Utah 
Sept. 25, 1967 Notary Public - residing at 
My commission expires 
</ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the date hereof, I served two true 
and correct copies of APPELLEE'S BRIEF, by depositing the same in the U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following parties: 
GARY G. SACKETT (2041) 
GLENN D. WATKINS (3397) 
ANDREW H. STONE (4921) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
DATED this 24th day of June, 1997. 
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